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Abstract. Threenotionsofdeﬁnabilityinmultimodallogicareconsidered.Twoareanalogousto
the notions of explicit deﬁnability and implicit deﬁnability introduced by Beth in the context of ﬁrst-
order logic. However, while by Beth’s theorem the two types of deﬁnability are equivalent for ﬁrst-
order logic, such an equivalence does not hold for multimodal logics. A third notion of deﬁnability,
reducibility, is introduced; it is shown that in multimodal logics, explicit deﬁnability is equivalent
to the combination of implicit deﬁnability and reducibility. The three notions of deﬁnability are
characterized semantically using (modal) algebras. The use of algebras, rather than frames, is shown
to be necessary for these characterizations.
§1. Introduction. In the context of logic, the notion of the deﬁnability of an entity,
described in broad strokes, refers to the expression or determination of that entity in terms
of other entities of the same type in the framework of a certain logic. A simple example is
the deﬁnition of conjunction in terms of negation and disjunction in propositional calculus.
Closer to this paper is the case of the deﬁnition of the diamond operator in modal logics in
terms of the box operator by the formula ♦p ↔¬  ¬p.
Two notions of predicate deﬁnability, explicit and implicit deﬁnability, were ﬁrst for-
malized by Beth (1953) for ﬁrst-order logic:
An n-ary predicate R is explicitly deﬁned in a ﬁrst-order logic   if there
is a formula R(x1,...,xn) ↔ ϕ in   such that ϕ does not contain the
predicate R.
The predicate R is implicitly deﬁned in   if there do not exist two
models of   that have the same domain and agree on the meaning of
all predicates other than R, but disagree on the meaning of R.
Beth’s theorem states that the predicate R is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if it is
implicitly deﬁned in  .
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In this paper, we study modal deﬁnability in the context of multimodal logic, by consid-
ering when one modality is deﬁned in terms of others. For ease of exposition, we assume
that all modal operators are unary.
The modality M is explicitly deﬁned in a multimodal logic   if there
exists a formula Mp↔ δ in   such that M does not occur in δ.
The modality M is implicitly deﬁned in a multimodal logic   if there
do not exist two models of   that coincide except in the interpretation
of M.1
Just as in ﬁrst-order logic, if a modality is explicitly deﬁned in a modal logic  , then it is
implicitly deﬁned in  . But the converse does not hold for modal logic. An example of this
is the multimodal logic of KD45 belief and S5 knowledge. As we show in Halpern et al.
(2008), in this logic knowledge is implicitly deﬁned but not explicitly deﬁned. Henceforth,
we refer to this paper as “the companion paper”.2
We can understand the relationship between explicit and implicit deﬁnability in mul-
timodal logic by considering a third notion of deﬁnability. Let  0 be the sublogic of  
consisting of formulas that do not mention the modality M.
The modality M is reducible to the other modalities in   if there is a
formula Mp ↔ δ such that M does not occur in δ and the logic  0 +
(Mp ↔ δ) generated by  0 and this deﬁnition of M (a) includes   and
(b) is a conservative extension of  0.
As we argue in the companion paper, reducibility comes closest to capturing our intu-
itions when we say that knowledge is (or is not) deﬁnable in terms of belief. The question
we are asking is whether, for example, by deﬁning knowledge as true belief, that is, by
adding Kp↔ p∧Bpto the logic of belief, we can recover all the properties of knowledge
of interest. If M is explicitly deﬁned in  , then   contains  0 + (Mp ↔ δ). With
reducibility, the containment goes in the opposite direction.
When M is explicitly deﬁned in   by the formula Mp ↔ δ, then M is reducible to the
other modalities in M by the same formula, and M is implicitly deﬁned in  . However,
neither implicit deﬁnability nor reducibility implies explicit deﬁnability. Our main result
states that
the modality M is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if it is implicitly
deﬁned in   and is reducible in   to the other modalities.
Reducibility can be deﬁned in ﬁrst-order languages analogously to the deﬁnition for
multimodal logics. It is easily seen to follow from explicit deﬁnability. Thus, by Beth’s
theorem, implicit deﬁnability implies reducibility. However, in the context of modal logic,
implicit deﬁnability and reducibility are incomparable. In the companion paper, we exam-
inethethreenotionsofdeﬁnabilityinthecontextoflogicsofknowledgeandbelief.Among
other things, we show that in the logic of KD45 belief and S5 knowledge, knowledge
is implicitly deﬁned but it is not reducible to belief; in the logic of KD45 belief and
1 Implicit deﬁnability can be deﬁned syntactically, both in ﬁrst-order and in multimodal logics.
By the completeness theorem, the syntactic version is equivalent to that above. In Section 3, we
actually deﬁne implicit deﬁnability syntactically.
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S4-knowledge, knowledge is not implicitly deﬁned but is reducible to belief by deﬁning
knowledge as true belief (i.e., using the formula Kp↔ p ∧ Bp).
The fact that S5 knowledge is implicitly deﬁned by KD45 belief implies that there is
a unique way to extend each frame for KD45 belief to a frame for S5 knowledge. It may
seem surprising that this is the case and yet S5 knowledge is not reducible to belief. We
explain this apparent disconnect between syntax and semantics by going beyond frames to
(modal) algebras (Blackburn et al., 2001; Kracht, 1999). Although each frame for KD45
belief can be extended to a frame for S5 knowledge, we show that there is an algebra for
KD45 belief that cannot be extended to an algebra for S5 knowledge.
Algebras play a signiﬁcant role in this paper. The three notions of deﬁnability we con-
sider are all deﬁned syntactically (i.e., in terms of whether formulas are in certain logics).
We characterize each of them semantically, using algebras. As we show, in a precise sense,
the greater generality of algebras is necessary for our characterizations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant
deﬁnitions of modal logic that we need for this paper. In Section 3, we carefully deﬁne
our three notions of deﬁnability, state our main theorem, and compare our notions to other
notions of deﬁnability that have been considered before in the context of modal logic.
In Section 4, we give semantic characterizations of our notions in terms of algebras. We
discuss the extent to which we can characterize our notions using frames; this also allows
us to relate deﬁnability in modal logic to deﬁnability in ﬁrst-order logic. Most proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
§2. Modal logic review: syntax, semantics, and axioms. In this section, we review
the essentials of modal logic, including syntax, semantics, and standard axiomatizations.
The reader is encouraged to consult a standard reference (e.g., Blackburn et al., 2001;
Kracht, 1999) for more details.
2.1. Modallogics. Let P beanonemptysetofprimitivepropositions.Let M1,...,Mn
bemodaloperatorsormodalities.Formulasaredeﬁnedbyinduction.Eachprimitivepropo-
sition is a formula. If ϕ and ψ are formulas then ¬ϕ, (ϕ → ψ), and Miϕ for i = 1,...,n,
are also formulas.3 The propositional connectives ∨, ∧, ↔ are deﬁned in terms of ¬
and → in the usual way; we take true to be an abbreviation of p ∨¬p. The language
L(M1,...,Mn) is the set of all formulas deﬁned in this way.
For the purposes of this paper, we take a (modal) logic   to be any collection of formulas
in a language L(M1,...,Mn) that (a) contains all tautologies of propositional logic; (b)
is closed under modus ponens, so that if ϕ ∈   and ϕ → ψ ∈  , then ψ ∈  ; and
(c) is closed under substitution, so that if ϕ ∈  , p is a primitive proposition, and ψ ∈
L(M1,...,Mn), then ϕ[p/ψ] ∈  , where ϕ[p/ψ] is the formula that results by replacing
all occurrences of p in ϕ by ψ. A logic   is normal if, in addition, for each modal operator
Mi,   contains the axiom KMi, Mi(p → q) → (Mi p → Miq), and is closed under
generalization, so that if ϕ ∈  , then so is Miϕ. In this paper, we consider only normal
modal logics. If  1 and  2 are two sets of formulas, we denote by  1 +  2 the smallest
normal modal logic containing  1 and  2.E v e ni f 1 and  2 are themselves normal
modal logics,  1 ∪  2 may not be; for example, it may not be closed under the modus
3 The modalities in this paper are unary. It is straightforward to extend our results to modal
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ponens. Thus,  1+ 2 will in general be a superset of  1∪ 2. Note that if   is a normal
logic and L is a language (which might not contain  ), then   ∩ L is a normal logic.
2.2. Frames and Kripke models. Perhaps the most common approach to giving se-
mantics to modal logic makes use of frames and Kripke models. We review this approach
in this section, and consider an alternative approach, using algebras and algebraic models,
in the next subsection.
A frame F for the language L(M1,...,Mn) is a tuple (W, R1,...,Rn), where W is
a nonempty set of possible worlds (worlds, for short), and for each i = 1,...,n, Ri ⊆
W × W is a binary relation on W, called the accessibility relation for the modality Mi.
A Kripke model M based on the frame F is a pair (F,V) where V : P → 2W is a
valuation of the primitive propositions as subsets of W.
The function V is extended inductively to a meaning function [[·]] M on all formulas.
We omit the subscript M when it is clear from context. For each primitive formula
p,[ [p]] = V(p). For all formulas ϕ and ψ,[ [ ¬ϕ]] =¬ [[ϕ]], where we abuse notation and
use ¬ to denote set theoretic complementation, [[ϕ ∨ ψ]] = ([[ϕ]]) ∪ [[ψ]], and [[ Miϕ]] =
{x | Ri(x) ⊆ [[ϕ]]}, where Ri(x) ={ y | (x, y) ∈ Ri}.
We write (M,w)|  ϕ if w ∈ [[ϕ]]. When [[ϕ]] = W, we write M |  ϕ and say that ϕ is
valid in M. The formula ϕ is valid in a frame F if it is valid in each of the models based
on F. The set of formulas that are valid in a frame F is called the theory of F, denoted
Th(F). For a class S of frames, Th(S) is the set of formulas that are valid in each frame in
S. A logic   is sound for S if   ⊆ Th(S), and is complete for S if   ⊇ Th(S). A frame
F is said to be a  -frame if   ⊆ Th(F).
The canonical frame for   is deﬁned on the set W that consists of all maximally
consistent sets of formulas in L. The set W is made a frame by deﬁning, for each modality
Mi, a relation Ri such that (w,w ) ∈ Ri if, for all formulas ϕ,i fMiϕ ∈ w then ϕ ∈ w . The
canonical model is the model based on the canonical frame with the valuation V deﬁned
by V(p) ={ w: p ∈ w}. Every normal logic   is sound and complete with respect to its
canonical model, but may not be sound with respect to its canonical frame.
In the sequel, we consider the logic (KD45)B+(S5)K +{L1,L2}⊆L(B, K), where the
modal operator B satisﬁes the axioms of KD45, K satisﬁes the axioms of S5, and L1 and
L2 are axioms that link K and B. To make this paper self-contained, we list the relevant
axioms here:
(DB) Bp →¬B¬p
(4B) Bp → BBp





(L2) Bp → KBp.
2.3. Algebras and algebraic models. We now consider a more general approach for
giving semantics to modal logics, using algebras and algebraic models, that goes back to
J´ onsson & Tarski (1951, 1952). As we shall see, syntactical notions of deﬁnability have
certain semantic equivalents that can be formulated in terms of algebras but not in terms of
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A modal algebra (or algebra for short) A for the language L(M1,...,Mn) is a tuple
(B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn),
where (B,∨,¬,1) is a Boolean algebra, and for each i = 1,...,n, Mi is a unary operator
on B.A nalgebraic model M based on the algebra A is a pair (A,V), where V : P → B
is a valuation of the primitive propositions as elements of B. The function V is extended
inductively to a meaning function [[·]] M on all formulas: [[¬ϕ]] M =¬ [[ϕ]] M (where
the second ¬ is the operator in the Boolean algebra, not set complementation), [[ϕ ∨
ψ]] M = ([[ϕ]])M ∨ [[ψ]] M (where the second ∨ is the operator in the Boolean algebra),
and [[Miϕ]] M = Mi([[ϕ]] M). We again omit the subscript M if no confusion results.
A formula ϕ is valid in M if [[ϕ]] M = 1; it is valid in A if it is valid in all algebraic models
based on A. Soundness and completeness are deﬁned just as for Kripke models. We deﬁne
Th(M) and Th(A) in the obvious way. A is a  -algebra if   ⊆ Th(A); similarly, M is
an algebraic model for   if   ⊆ Th(M).
Each frame F = (W, R1,...,Rn) is associated in a natural way with the algebra A =
(2W,∨,¬,W,M1,...,Mn), where ∨ is union, ¬ is set theoretic complementation, and,
for i = 1,...,n, the set operator Mi is deﬁned by taking
Mi(E) ={ x | Ri(x) ⊆ E}
for E ⊆ W. Similarly, we associate with the Kripke model (F,V) the algebraic model
(A,V) with the same valuation function V. It is easy to see that the meaning functions in
both models coincide.
It is well known that there are algebras that are not associated with frames. We demon-
strate in the sequel that, as a consequence, the set of  -frames may have a particular deﬁn-
ability property that does not correspond to a property of  . The deﬁnability properties of
 -algebras, on the other hand, correspond exactly to those of the logic  .
For a logic   in a language L, deﬁne an equivalence relation ≡  on L by ϕ ≡  ψ iff
ϕ ↔ ψ ∈  . Consider the partition of   into equivalence classes L/≡ . The equivalence
class that contains the formula ϕ is denoted |ϕ| . The Lindenbaum–Tarski  -algebra is the
Boolean algebra (L/≡ ,∨,¬,|true| ) where |ϕ|  ∨ |ψ|  = |(ϕ ∨ ψ)|  and ¬|ϕ|  =
|¬ϕ| ; we leave it to the reader to check that these deﬁnitions are independent of the
choice of representative of the equivalence class, and so are well deﬁned. The canonical
 -algebra A  is the modal algebra based on the Lindenbaum–Tarski  -algebra where,
for each i, Mi(|ϕ| ) = |Mi(ϕ)| . It is easy to see that since   is a normal logic, all the
operators are well deﬁned. The canonical algebraic model for   is M  = (A ,V ),
where V (p) = |p| . It is well known that   is sound and complete with respect to the
class of  -algebras, with respect to {A }, and with respect to {M } (Blackburn et al.,
2001; Kracht, 1999).
§3. Three notions of deﬁnability. In this section we examine the three different no-
tions of deﬁning one modality in terms of others mentioned in the Introduction.
Let δ be a formula in L(M1,...,Mn−1). The formula
(DMn) Mnp ↔ δ
is called a deﬁnition of Mn (in terms of M1,...,Mn−1). When the only primitive proposi-
tion in δ is p we say that the deﬁnition is simple.456 JOSEPH Y. HALPERN ET AL.
The formula DMn is the obvious analogue of the formula used in ﬁrst-order logic to de-
ﬁne one predicate in terms of others. We also have an obvious analogue of the notion of ex-
plicit deﬁnability in ﬁrst-order logic. Consider a logic   in the language L(M1,...,Mn).
Explicit deﬁnability: Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   if there is a deﬁnition
DMn of Mn such that DMn ∈  .
In the context of ﬁrst-order logic, an apparently weaker notion of deﬁnability called
implicit deﬁnability has been studied. We deﬁne what seems to be the appropriate analogue
for modal logic. Let M 
n be a modal operator distinct from M1,...,Mn, and consider the
language L(M1,...,Mn, M 
n). The logic  [Mn/M 
n] is obtained by replacing all occur-
rences of Mn in formulas in   by M 
n.
Implicit deﬁnability: Mn is implicitly deﬁned in   if Mnp ↔ M 
np ∈
  +  [Mn/M 
n].
To simplify notation, we henceforth take L =L(M1,...,Mn), L0 =L(M1,...,Mn−1),
and  0 =  ∩ 0. With this notation, explicit deﬁnability can be described by the inclusion
 0 + DMn ⊆  .
The notion of reducibility, which we introduce next, seems to capture our intuition of
deﬁning knowledge in terms of belief better than the notion of explicit deﬁnability. When
we deﬁne knowledge as true, justiﬁed belief, we do not expect this deﬁnition to follow
from the logic that characterizes knowledge. We expect just the opposite: that the desired
properties of knowledge follow from this deﬁnition when it is added to the logic of belief
and justiﬁcation. We get this effect by reversing the inclusion in the above description of
explicit deﬁnability. Recall that a logic   in a language L is a conservative extension of a
logic    in a language L  ⊆ L if    =   ∩ L .
Reducibility: Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   if there is a def-
inition DMn of Mn, such that   ⊆  0 + DMn, and  0 + DMn is a
conservative extension of  0.
The requirement that  0+DMn be a conservative extension of  0 guarantees that when
  is consistent, then  0+DMn is also consistent. It also enables us to consider only simple
deﬁnitions of Mn, as we state next.
PROPOSITION 3.1. If Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in  , then it is reducible by a
simple deﬁnition.
But the main reason to require that  0 + DMn be a conservative extension of  0 is to
ensure that the deﬁnition DMn does not affect the operators M1,...,Mn−1. Without this
requirement it is possible that the deﬁnition “sneaks in” extra properties of the deﬁning
modalities as demonstrated in the following example.
EXAMPLE 3.2. Let   be the minimal normal logic in L. Obviously,  0 is the minimal
normal logic in L0. Let DMn be the formula Mnp ↔¬ M1(p ∧¬p). By the minimality
of  ,   ⊆  0 + DMn. By the generalization rule, Mntrue ∈  0 + DMn, and therefore
¬M1(true∧¬true) ∈  0+DMn. But this formula is not in  0. Thus, the smallest normal
logic containing both DMn and  0 includes formulas in L0 not in  0.
We further discuss reducibility and some of its variants in Section 5 of the companion
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In ﬁrst-order logic, Beth’s (1953) theorem states that implicit and explicit deﬁnability
coincide. When reducibility is deﬁned for ﬁrst-order logics, analogously to the deﬁnition
for multimodal logic, then it can be shown to be implied by the other two notions of
deﬁnability. However, in the context of modal logic, none of the statements above holds,
as demonstrated by the following proposition, which is proved in the companion paper.
PROPOSITION 3.3.
(a) Knowledgeisneitherexplicitlynorimplicitlydeﬁnedinthelogic(KD45)B+(S4)K+
{L1,L2}), but it is reducible to belief in this logic.
(b) Knowledgeisneitherexplicitlydeﬁnednorreducibletobeliefinthelogic(KD45)B+
(S5)K +{ L1,L2}), but it is implicitly deﬁned in this logic.
The two parts of this proposition show that neither implicit deﬁnability nor reducibility
implies explicit deﬁnability, and that neither implicit deﬁnability nor reducibility implies
the other.
The following theorem describes the relations between the three notions of deﬁnability.
THEOREM 3.4. The modal operator Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if Mn is
implicitly deﬁned and reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in  .
We provide a direct proof of Theorem 3.4. in the Appendix. We also give an alternative
proof later which uses the semantic characterizations of the three notions of deﬁnability
given in the next section.
Maksimova (1992a, 1992b) studies implicit and explicit deﬁnability of primitive propo-
sitions (rather than modal operators) in unimodal logics. She shows that implicit and
explicit deﬁnability of primitive propositions are equivalent for large classes of modal
logics (in particular, for those containing K4). Our results show that this equivalence does
not hold for our notions of implicit and explicit deﬁnability. (See Kracht, 1999, for a
discussion of deﬁnability of primitive propositions in modal logic.)
Lenzen (1979) also studied deﬁnability of one modality in terms of other modalities.
He requires that the deﬁnition DMn be simple (which in our framework follows from
reducibility in Proposition 3.1.), and calls the logic   + DMn (i.e., the underlying logic
extended by a deﬁnition DMn)adeﬁnitional extension of  . He calls two logics   ⊆
L(M1,...,Mn−1, Mn) and    ⊆ L(M1,...,Mn−1, M 
n) synonymous when there is a
third logic  ∗ ∈ L(M1,...,Mn−1, Mn, M 
n) that is a deﬁnitional extension of both   and
  . To relate Lenzen’s deﬁnitional extension to our terminology, we note that if we add the
requirement that   + DMn is a conservative extension of  , then, in our terminology, Mn
is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in the logic   + DMn by DMn.
There has also been relevant work on translation schemes between languages that is
relevant to our work (see Pelletier & Urquhart, 2003, and the references therein).
A deﬁnition DMn of the modality Mn deﬁnes a natural translation ϕ  → ϕt from the
language L to L0 that is described in the Appendix. When Mn is explicitly deﬁned in  ,
then for every ϕ ∈  , the translated formula ϕt is in  0 (see Lemma A.2. in the Appendix).
In the terminology of Pelletier and Urquhart, this means that the translation is sound (with
respect to the logics   and  0).
§4. The semantics of deﬁnability. In this section, we provide semantic characteriza-
tions of the three notions of deﬁnability we have been considering. We use the following
deﬁnition. An algebra A for the language L is an extension of an algebra A  for L  ⊆ L if458 JOSEPH Y. HALPERN ET AL.
A is obtained by adding to A  operators that correspond to the modalities in L that are not
in L . Similarly, a frame F for the language L is an extension of a frame F  for L  ⊆ L if
F is obtained by adding to F  relations that correspond to the modalities in L that are not
in L .I fA (F) is obtained by adding operators (Mi)i∈I to A  (relations (Ri)i∈I to F ), we
sometimes abuse notation and write A = (A ,(Mi)i∈I) (F = (F ,(Ri)i∈I)).
Note that if A extends A , then for all models M = (A,V) and M  = (A ,V) and each
formulaϕ ∈ L ,weha v e[ [ϕ]] M = [[ϕ]] M .ForanalgebraA = (B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn),
let A0 denote the algebra (B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn−1). Clearly, A is an extension of A0.
Similar remarks apply to frames and Kripke models.
We start with the characterization of implicit deﬁnability.
THEOREM 4.1. The following are equivalent:
(a) the modality Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  ;
(b) if A = (A0,Mn) and A  = (A0,M 
n) are  -algebras, then Mn = M 
n.
We cannot expect a characterization of implicit deﬁnability in terms of frames, since
a normal logic may not be complete with respect to its frames; indeed, there may be no
frames for a logic at all. In the next section we formulate a characterization of implicit
deﬁnability in terms of frames for a restricted class of logics, and relate modal deﬁnability
to ﬁrst-order deﬁnability of relations for this class of logics.
The characterization of explicit deﬁnability and reducibility is done in terms of algebras
only. In the next section we will see why an analogous characterization in terms of frames
or Kripke models is impossible.
For the next two characterizations we need the following deﬁnition. An algebra of
operators O on a Boolean algebra (B,∨,¬,1) is a set O of unary operators on B that
is itself a Boolean algebra and is closed under composition. Thus, for every f,g ∈ O, ¬ f ,
f ∨ g, and f ◦ g are all in O, where (¬ f )(x) =¬f (x), ( f ∨ g)(x) = f (x) ∨ g(x), and
( f ◦ g)(x) = f (g(x)). The top element in O is the constant operator that always returns
the value 1 in B.
For an algebra A = (B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn), let O∗
A be the smallest algebra of oper-
ators on B that contains the operators M1,...,Mn, and let A0 be the algebra (B,∨,¬,1,
M1,...,Mn−1).
THEOREM 4.2. The modality Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if, for each
 -algebra A, O∗
A = O∗
A0.
THEOREM 4.3. The modality Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   if and only if each
 0-algebra A0 has an extension to a  -algebra A such that O∗
A = O∗
A0.
In light of Theorems 4.1., 4.2., and 4.3., the following result can be viewed as a re-
formulation of Theorem 3.4. in semantic terms. One of the implications in this result is
signiﬁcantly simpler to prove than the analogous implication in Theorem 3.4.; moreover,
it provides an alternative proof of this result.
THEOREM 4.4. For each  -algebra A = (B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn), O∗
A = O∗
A0 iff (a)
every  0-algebra A0 can be extended to a  -algebra A such that O∗
A = O∗
A0 and (b) if
A = (A0,Mn) and A  = (A0,M 
n) are  -algebras, then Mn = M 
n.
§5. Deﬁnability and frame semantics. The semantic characterizations of deﬁnability
in Section 4 mainly use algebras rather than frames. Here we explore the relationshipON DEFINABILITY IN MULTIMODAL LOGIC 459
between modal deﬁnability and frame semantics. Of course, we cannot expect a frame
semantic characterization for all normal logics, since some normal logics are poorly de-
scribedbyframesemantics.Wethereforerestrictourselvestowhatwecall orthodoxlogics,
to be deﬁned shortly, for which frame semantics is adequate. Using frame semantics for
orthodoxlogicsenablesustoexploretherelationshipbetweenthedeﬁnabilityofmodalities
and the deﬁnability of predicates in ﬁrst-order logic.
Given a language L, the ﬁrst-order frame language of L, denoted Lfo, is the ﬁrst-order
language with equality that includes, for every modality Mi in L, a binary predicate Rfo
i .
The frames of many axioms of modal logic can be described in the frame language. Thus,
for example, the axiom Kp → p is valid in a frame iff the relation corresponding to K
is reﬂexive, which is expressed in the ﬁrst-order frame language by ∀xRfo
K(x,x).W es a y
in this case that Kp → p and ∀xRfo
K(x,x) correspond. In general, formulas ϕ ∈ L and
α ∈ Lfo correspond if, for all frames F for L, ϕ is valid in F iff α is valid in F.
A formula ϕ ∈ L is canonical if it is valid in the canonical frame of each logic  
that contains ϕ (Blackburn et al., 2001). If the logic   is generated by a set of canonical
formulas (i.e., if there is a set C of canonical formulas such that   is the smallest logic
containing C), then   is complete with respect to its canonical frame. A logic is orthodox
if it is generated by a set A of formulas such that each formula f ∈ A is canonical and
corresponds to a ﬁrst-order formula. Let Afo denote the set of ﬁrst-order formulas that
correspond to the formulas in A. The ﬁrst-order logic  fo generated by Afo is sound and
complete with respect to all  -frames.
5.1. Implicit deﬁnability. The implicit deﬁnability of a modality can be characterized
by frame semantics in a way analogous to the algebraic characterization of Theorem 4.1.
This characterization is stated in the next theorem, as well as its characterization in terms
of the deﬁnability properties of the predicate corresponding to the modality in the frame
language.
THEOREM 5.1. If   is an orthodox logic in the language L(M1,...,Mn), then the
following are equivalent:
(a) the modality Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  ;
(b) for all  -frames (F0, Rn) and (F0, R 
n), we have Rn = R 
n;
(c) the predicate Rfo
n is implicitly deﬁned in  fo;
(d) the predicate Rfo
n is explicitly deﬁned in  fo.
The equivalence of (b) and (c) follows from the fact that the set of  -frames is the set of
 fo-models and the deﬁnition of implicit deﬁnability for ﬁrst-order logic. The equivalence
of (c) and (d) is Beth’s theorem. We prove in the Appendix that (a) is equivalent to (b).
The latter equivalence is the frame semantics counterpart of Theorem 4.1. Parts (b) and
(c) of Theorem 5.1 show that for orthodox logics, the implicit deﬁnability of a modality is
equivalent to the implicit and explicit deﬁnability of its corresponding relation.
Theorem 5.1. can be used to provide a semantic proof of Proposition 3.3.(b), namely,
that S5 knowledge is implicitly deﬁned in (KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}. This logic is
orthodox; thus, it sufﬁces to show that the relation RK is explicitly deﬁned by the predicate
Rfo
B associated with the relation RB. The following proposition shows that this is indeed
the case.
PROPOSITION 5.2. The formula Rfo
K(x, y) ↔∃ z(Rfo
B (x,z) ∧ Rfo
B (y,z)) is valid in all
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5.2. Explicit deﬁnability. The explicit deﬁnability of Mn is characterized semantically
in Theorem 4.2. by the condition O∗
A = O∗
A0, or equivalently, Mn ∈ O∗
A0. This condition
says that the algebraic operator Mn is generated using Boolean operations and composition
from the algebraic operators M1,...,Mn−1. An analogous frame semantics condition
is that Rfo
n can be explicitly deﬁned in terms of Rfo
1 ,...,Rfo
n−1. But this condition does
not characterize the explicit deﬁnability of Mn. The logic (KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}
illustrates this claim. As stated in Proposition 5.2., Rfo
K is explicitly deﬁned by Rfo
B , yet,
by Proposition 3.3., the modality K is not explicitly deﬁned by B. This gap between
deﬁnability in the modal logic and deﬁnability in the ﬁrst-order frame language is due
to the fact that in orthodox logics, the ﬁrst-order frame language is more expressive than
the modal language it is associated with.
5.3. Reducibility. A frame semantics analogue of Theorem 4.3. would state that Mn
is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in an orthodox logic   if and only if each  0-frame (W,
R1,...,Rn−1) can extended to a  -frame (W, R1,...,Rn−1, Rn) in which Rfo
n can be ex-
plicitlydeﬁned.Butthisclaimisfalse.Consideragainthelogic(KD45)B+(S5)K+{ L1,L2}.
It is easy to show that every (KD45)B frame can be extended to a ((KD45)B + (S5)K +
{L1,L2}) frame (see Proposition A.2. in the companion paper). Combining this result with
Proposition 5.2., it follows that every (KD45)B frame can be extended to a ((KD45)B +
(S5)K +{ L1,L2}) frame in which Rfo
K is explicitly deﬁned. Yet, by Proposition 3.3,
K is not reducible to B in this logic. By the semantic characterization of reducibility in
Theorem 4.3., it follows that (KD45)B algebras should not have this property of extension
that (KD45)B frames have. Indeed, we next construct an example of a (KD45)B algebra
that cannot be extended at all to a ((KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}) algebra. This exam-
ple also provides a direct proof of the irreducibility of S5 knowledge to belief stated in
Proposition 3.3., using the semantic characterization of reducibility in Theorem 4.3.
EXAMPLE5.3. Let(B,∪,¬,W)betheBooleanalgebraoftheﬁniteandcoﬁnitesubsets
of the set of nonnegative integers W ={ 0,1,2,...} (recall that a coﬁnite set is the
complement of a ﬁnite set), where the Boolean operations are union and set theoretic
complement, and the top element is W. Let U be the subset of B which consists of all
the coﬁnite sets. Deﬁne an operator B on B by taking
B(E) =

E ∪{ 0} if E ∈ U
E \{ 0} if E  ∈ U.
THEOREM 5.4. The algebra A = (B,∪,¬,W,B) is a (KD45)B algebra that cannot
be extended to a (KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}) algebra.
Note that by the J´ onsson–Tarski theorem (Blackburn et al., 2001), the (KD45)B set
algebra in Example 5.3. can be isomorphically embedded in a (KD45)B set algebra in
which the operator B is derived from a relation. However, in the algebra of the example
itself, B is not derived from a relation on W. Indeed, if it were, then, by Proposition A.2. of
the companion paper, we could extend this model to one where an S5 knowledge operator
is deﬁned.
The only properties of B and U used in the proof of Theorem 5.4. are the facts that B
is an algebra that contains all the singletons and that U is a nonprincipal ultraﬁlter in B.4
4 Recall that a ﬁlter C in B is a set of sets in B that is closed under supersets and intersection (so
that if E1, E2 ∈ C and E1 ⊆ E3, then E3 ∈ C and E1 ∩ E2 ∈ C); the ﬁlter C is proper if ∅  ∈ C;ON DEFINABILITY IN MULTIMODAL LOGIC 461
Thus, the theorem also holds if we take B to be 2W and U to be a nonprincipal ultraﬁlter
on W. These conditions also hold if W = [0,1], B consists of all Borel sets in [0,1] that
have Lebesgue measure either 0 or 1, and U consists of all the sets in B with Lebesgue
measure 1.
Theorem5.4.hasanother,somewhatsurprising,application.Itallowsustoprovegeneral
results regarding the irreducibility of knowledge to a combination of belief and justiﬁca-
tion. In the companion paper, we show that knowledge cannot be reduced to belief in the
logic (KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}. However, that does not preclude knowledge from
being reducible to a combination of belief and justiﬁcation. Indeed, as we observe in the
companion paper, without some constraints, knowledge can be reduced to a combination
of belief and justiﬁcation. For example, if J satisﬁes all the axioms of S5 and the axioms
L1 and L2 with K replaced by J, then we can reduce K to J by the deﬁnition Kp↔ Jp.
We now provide an arguably reasonable condition on a logic   of belief and justiﬁcation
that sufﬁces to guarantee that knowledge is not reducible to belief and justiﬁcation in  .
Roughly speaking, the condition says that the interaction between B and J is rather weak.
We give two interpretations of this condition. The ﬁrst is semantic, and is expressed in
terms of algebras. It requires that every (KD45)B algebra be extendible to an algebra of
  ∩ L(B, J); intuitively, it says that the properties of J do not put any constraints on B.
THEOREM5.5. Let bealogicinL(B, J, K)suchthat(KD45)B+(S5)K+{L1,L2}⊆
 . If every (KD45)B algebra can be extended to an algebra of  ∩L(B, J), then K is not
reducible to B and J in  .
Obviously, our previous example that shows how S5 knowledge can be reduced to belief
and justiﬁcation must fail the stipulation of Theorem 5.5. That is, it must be the case that
some (KD45)B algebra cannot be extended to a   ∩ L(B, J)-algebra. But the operator J
in our example is just an S5 knowledge operator, and thus it must be the case that there is
a (KD45)B algebra that cannot be extended to an algebra of belief and S5 knowledge. But
this is precisely what is shown in Theorem 5.4. Theorem 5.4. not only shows that certain
logics do not satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 5.5., but is actually the key to its proof.
The following corollary gives a syntactic version of the statement that the interaction
between B and J be weak. It says that the axioms for B and J can be “decomposed” into
axioms for B (KD45B) and axioms for J (which are contained in S5J).
COROLLARY 5.6. Let   be a logic in L(B, J, K) such that  ∩L(B, J) = (KD45)B +
 J, where  J ⊆ (S5)J. Then K is not reducible to B and J in  .
Thus, as long as there is no axiomatic link between belief and justiﬁcation, and justiﬁca-
tion does not have any properties that go beyond S5, then knowledge is not reducible to a
combination of belief and justiﬁcation. See the companion paper for further discussion of
this issue.
5.4. Interpolation. A logic   has the interpolation property if for any formula ϕ1 →
ϕ2 in  , there exists a formula χ (an interpolant) whose nonlogical constants are common
to ϕ1 and ϕ2 such that ϕ1 → χ and χ → ϕ2 are in  . Craig’s interpolation theorem states
that ﬁrst-order logic has the interpolation property. The interpolation property is used in
the proof of Beth’s theorem to show that implicit deﬁnability implies explicit deﬁnability.
it is nonprincipal if there is no E ∈ B such that C consists of all supersets of E;a nultraﬁlter is a
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The proof makes use of the deduction theorem, which says that for a set of sentences  
and a sentence ϕ,i fψ is in the logic generated by   ∪{ ϕ}, then ϕ → ψ is in the logic
generated by  .
In the case of modal logic, Andr´ eka et al. (1998) sketch a proof for the following
interpolation theorem. Let   be the minimal normal modal logic in some multimodal
language L.5 If ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∈  , then there exists a formula χ that contains only modalities
that are contained in both ϕ1 and ϕ2 such that ϕ1 → χ and χ → ϕ2 are in  . However,
implicit deﬁnability in normal multimodal logics does not imply explicit deﬁnability. The
failureofBeth’stheoremforsuchlogicsisduetothefactthatthereisnodeductiontheorem
for modal logics.
Craig’s interpolation theorem for ﬁrst-order logic can be generalized as follows. Let L1
and L2 be two ﬁrst-order languages, and let   be a logic in the language L = L1 ∪ L2.
If ϕ1 → ϕ2 ∈  , then there exists a formula χ ∈ L1 ∩ L2 such that ϕ1 → χ and χ → ϕ2
are in  . This result also makes use of the deduction theorem.
Again,inthemodalcasethisgeneralizationdoesnothold.Thelogic (KD45)B+(S5)K+
{L1,L2}, discussed in Subsection 5.1., demonstrates this, and highlights the difference
between an orthodox modal logic and the corresponding ﬁrst-order logic. For i = 1,2,
consider the multimodal logic  i = (KD45)B + (S5)Ki +{ L1,L2} in the language
L(B, Ki). Let   =  1 +  2. By Proposition 3.3.(b), K1p ↔ K2p ∈  . However,
there is no formula χ in the language L(B, K1) ∩ L(B, K2) = L(B) such that K1p → χ
and χ → K2 are in  . Indeed, if such a formula χ existed, then K1p ↔ χ would be in
 , because K2p → K1p ∈  . Let F = (W, RK1, RB) be the canonical frame for  1.
Obviously, the frame ˆ F = (W, RK1, RK2, RB), where RK2 = RK1, is a frame for which
 1 +  2 is sound. Thus, K1p ↔ ϕ is valid in ˆ F. But the interpretation of this formula
depends only on RK1 and RB. Thus, it is also valid in F. Hence, this formula is in  1,
which means that it is a deﬁnition of K1 in terms of B, contrary to Proposition 3.3.(b). The
corresponding ﬁrst-order logic  fo includes the formula Rfo
K1(x, y) ↔ Rfo




However, this interpolant has no modal equivalent.
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Appendix: Proofs.
In this Appendix, we prove all results whose proof was omitted from the main text. We
repeat the statement of the results for the reader’s convenience. We start with the proof of
two elementary lemmas that are used in many of the proofs.
LEMMA A.1. Let ϕ, ψ and χ be formulas in a language L, and let χ  be a formula
obtained by replacing some occurrences of ϕ in χ by ψ.I f  is a logic in L such that
ϕ ↔ ψ ∈   then χ ↔ χ  ∈  .
We omit the simple proof by induction on the structure of χ.
5 “Minimal” here means that it is the least set of formulas that contains all tautologies of
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Given a deﬁnition DMn, we construct a map ϕ  → ϕt that translates formulas ϕ in L
to formulas ϕt in L0. We deﬁne ϕt by induction on the structure of ϕ.I fϕ is a primitive
proposition, then ϕt = ϕ. We deﬁne (ϕ → ψ)t = (ϕt → ψt) and (¬ϕ)t =¬ ϕt.F o r
Mi  = Mn, (Miϕ)t = Miϕt, and (Mnϕ)t = δ[p/ϕt].
LEMMA A.2. For each formula ϕ ∈ L, the formula ϕ ↔ ϕt is in every logic that
contains DMn.
Proof. Let   be a logic that contains DMn. The proof that ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈   proceeds
by induction on the structure of formulas, using Lemma A.1. For the case of formulas
Mnϕ we use the assumption that DMn ∈  . From this it follows by substitution that
Mnϕ ↔ δ[p/ϕ] ∈   for each ϕ. By the induction hypothesis and Lemma A.1., δ[p/ϕ] ↔
δ[p/ϕt] ∈  , which implies that (Mnϕ)t ↔ Mnϕ ∈  .  
PROPOSITION 3.1. If Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in  , then it is reducible by a
simple deﬁnition.
Proof. Suppose that Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   by the deﬁnition Mnp ↔ δ.
Let DM 
n be the formula Mnp ↔ δ , where δ  is the formula obtained by substituting p for
all primitive propositions in δ. By substitution, DM 
n ∈  0 + DMn. Thus  0 + DM 
n ⊆
 0+DMn. It follows that δ ↔ δ  ∈  0+DMn. But δ ↔ δ  ∈ L0. Hence, since  0+ DM
is a conservative extension of  0, δ ↔ δ  ∈  0. This implies that DMn ∈  0 +DM 
n, and
hence  0 + DMn ⊆  0 + DM 
n. Therefore,  0 + DMn =  0 + DM 
n.  
In the proofs of the following two theorems, we write    for  [Mn/M 
n].
THEOREM 3.4. The modal operator Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if Mn is
implicitly deﬁned and reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in  .
Proof. LetDM 
n betheformula M 
np ↔ δ thatresultsfromreplacing Mn by M 
n inDMn.
Suppose that Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   by DMn. We ﬁrst show that   =  0 + DMn.
By deﬁnition,  0 ⊆   and, by assumption, DMn ∈  . Thus,  0 + DMn ⊆  .F o r
the opposite inclusion, let ϕ ∈ L. By Lemma A.2. and the explicit deﬁnability of Mn,
ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈  0 + DMn ⊆  .I fϕ ∈  , then ϕt ∈  ,s oϕt ∈  0. It follows that
ϕ ∈  0 + DMn, proving that   ⊆  0 + DMn, as desired. It immediately follows that Mn
is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in  .
To see that Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  , note that DMn ∈   and similarly DM 
n ∈   ;
thus, Mnp ↔ M 
np ∈   +   .
Now suppose that Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   by the deﬁnition DMn and
that Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  . Consider the set  ∗ of formulas in L(M1,...,Mn, M 
n)
deﬁned by  ∗ ={ ϕ : ϕt ∈   }. Here, ϕt is the translation of ϕ to the language L(M1,...,
Mn−1, M 
n) using DMn. Clearly    ⊆  ∗. As we now show, we also have   ⊆  ∗.
Indeed, if ϕ ∈  , then by reducibility, ϕ ∈  0 + DMn. Since, by Lemma A.2., ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈
 0 + DMn, it follows that ϕt ∈  0 + DMn. Since  0 + DMn is a conservative extension
of  0, ϕt ∈  0 ⊆   . Since ϕt ∈   , it follows that ϕ ∈  ∗, as desired.
We prove below that  ∗ is a logic. Therefore   +    ⊆  ∗. Since, by assumption,
Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  , Mnp ↔ M 
np ∈  ∗. Clearly DMn ∈  ∗, since DMt
n =
(δ ↔ δ) ∈   . Thus, by the equivalence of Mn and M 
n, we must have DM 
n ∈  ∗. But
(DM 
n)t = DM 
n, and thus DM 
n ∈   . It follows that DMn ∈  , as desired.
It remains to show that  ∗ is a logic. Since  ∗ contains the logics   and   [Mn/M 
n],
it contains all tautologies of propositional logic as well as the axiom KM for each modal
operator M ∈{ M1,...,Mn, M 
n}.464 JOSEPH Y. HALPERN ET AL.
To see that  ∗ is closed under modus ponens, suppose that ϕ,ϕ → ψ ∈  ∗. But then
ϕt and (ϕ → ψ)t = ϕt → ψt are in   . Thus, ψt ∈   ,s oψ ∈  ∗, as desired. Another
argument in this spirit shows that  ∗ is closed under substitution.
Finally, we must show that  ∗ satisﬁes the generalization rules. If M  = Mn and ψ ∈
 ∗ then, by deﬁnition, ψt ∈   . Moreover, (Mψ)t = M(ψt),s oMψt ∈    by the
generalization rule for M in   . Hence, Mψ ∈  ∗.I fM = Mn, we proceed as follows.
Since (Mnψ)t = δ[p/ψt], we need to show that δ[p/ψt] ∈  [Mn/M 
n]. Since ψt ∈
 [Mn/M 
n], it follows that ψt ↔ true ∈  [Mn/M 
n]. By Lemma A.1., δ[p/ψt] ↔
δ[p/true] ∈  [Mn/M 
n]. Thus, to complete the proof, we need to show that δ[p/true] ∈
 [Mn/M 
n]. Mntrue ∈   by generalization, so by reducibility, Mntrue ∈  0 + DMn.
Moreover, Mntrue ↔ δ[p/true] ∈  0 +DMn,s oδ[p/true] ∈  0 +DMn. But  0 +DMn
is a conservative extension of  0,s oδ[p/true] ∈  0 ⊆  [Mn/M 
n].  
THEOREM 4.1. The following are equivalent:
(a) the modality Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  ;
(b) if A = (A0,Mn) and A  = (A0,M 
n) are  -algebras, then Mn = M 
n.
Proof. To prove that (a) implies (b), suppose that Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  , and that
both A = (A0,Mn) and A  = (A0,M 
n) are  -algebras. Let A + A  denote the algebra
(A0,Mn,M 
n). Clearly all the formulas in  ∪   are valid in A+A ; moreover, the set of
formulas valid in an algebra is easily seen to be closed under substitution and generaliza-
tion, so all the formulas in  +   are also valid in A+A . Since Mn is implicitly deﬁned
in  , it follows that Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ ∈ Th(A + A ). Now suppose, by way of contradiction,
that Mn  = M 
n. Then for some x, Mn(x)  = M 
n(x). Consider the A + A  model M =
((A0,Mn,M ),V) where V(p) = x. Clearly [[Mnp]] M  = [[ Mnp]] M, giving the desired
contradiction.
To show that (b) implies (a), suppose that (b) holds. Let A = (A0,Mn,M 
n) be the
canonical (  +   )-algebra, where now M 
n is taken to be the interpretation of M 
n. Note
that ϕ ∈   ∪    iff ϕ ∈ Th(A). We can view both (A0,Mn) and (A0,M 
n) as  -algebras,
by taking M 
n to interpret Mn. By assumption, Mn = M 
n. Thus, Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ must be
valid in the canonical ( +  )-algebra for all formulas ϕ. Thus, Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ ∈  +  ,
so Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  .  
To prove Theorem 4.2., we need the the following lemma, whose straightforward proof
is omitted.
LEMMA A.3. Let   be the set of all formulas in L0 that contain only the primitive
proposition p and let A0 be a  0-algebra. There exists a unique function ϕ  → ϕop from
  to O∗
A0 that satisﬁes the following: pop is the identity operator; for each ϕ,ψ ∈  ,
(¬ϕ)op =¬ ϕop and (ϕ ∨ ψ)op = ϕop ∨ ψop; for each i = 1,...,n − 1, (Miϕ)op =
Mi ◦ ϕop. Moreover, this function is a surjection onto O∗
A0, and, for all ϕ ∈  , ψ ∈ L0,
and models M0 = (A0,V), [[ϕ[p/ψ]]]M0 = ϕop([[ψ]])M0.
THEOREM 4.2. The modality Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   if and only if, for each
 -algebra A, O∗
A = O∗
A0.
Proof. We ﬁrst note that O∗
A = O∗
A0 if and only if Mn ∈ O∗
A0. Assume that the
modality Mn is explicitly deﬁned in   via the deﬁnition Mnp ↔ δ, and let A be a  -
algebra. Thus, for each model M = (A,V), Mn([[ p]] M) = [[δ]] M. By Lemma A.3.,ON DEFINABILITY IN MULTIMODAL LOGIC 465
[[δ]] M = δop([[ p]] M). For all x ∈ A, let Mx = (A,Vx) be a model such that V(p) = x.






algebra of  . By Lemma A.3., there exists a formula δ ∈   such that Mn = δop. Moreover,
for each model M based on A, Mn([[ p]] M) = δop([[ p]] M) = [[δ]] M. Thus, Mnp ↔ δ is
valid in each model based on A, and hence Mnp ↔ δ ∈  .  
To prove Theorem 4.3., we need the following lemma, which will also be useful in our
later proofs.
LEMMA A.4. If L1 ⊆ L2,  1 ⊆  2 are two logics in the corresponding languages
such that  1 is sound and complete for a family S of frames, and each frame (algebra) in
S can be extended to a  2-frame (algebra), then  2 is a conservative extension of  1.
Proof. Suppose that the condition in the lemma holds. Let F be a  1-frame in S and
F  an extension of F to a  2-frame. Consider models M = (F,V) and M  = (F ,V).
Suppose that ϕ ∈  2 ∩L1. Then M  |  ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ L1, it follows that [[ϕ]] M  = [[ϕ]] M.
Thus, M |  ϕ. Since this is true for any model based on a frame in S, ϕ ∈  1, and hence
 2 ∩ L1 ⊆  1. The converse inclusion holds since  1 ⊆  2. The proof for algebras is
similar.  
THEOREM 4.3. The modality Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   if and only if each
 0-algebra A0 can be extended to a  -algebra A such that O∗
A = O∗
A0.
Proof. Suppose that Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   by DMn, which is Mnp↔δ.
Let A0 be a  0-algebra. Extend A0 to A by deﬁning Mn = δop. Thus, O∗
A = O∗
A0, and we
need only show that A is a  -algebra. Suppose that ϕ ∈  . By reducibility, ϕ ∈  0+DMn.
By Lemma A.2., ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈  0 + DMn. Thus, ϕt ∈  0 + DMn. Since  0 + DMn is a
conservative extension of  0, it follows that ϕt ∈  0. Consider a model M = (A,V)
and the model M0 = (A0,V). Since M and M0 agree on formulas in  0, and M0 is a
model of  0, we must have [[ϕt]] M = 1. It thus sufﬁces to show that for every formula
ϕ ∈ L,[ [ ϕ]] M = [[ϕt]] M. This is proved by induction on the structure of ϕ. We show
here only the case that ϕ = Mnψ. In this case, (Mnψ)t = δ[p/ψt]. By Lemma A.3.,
[[δ[p/ψt]]]M = δop([[ψt]] M). By the induction hypothesis, this is δop([[ψ]] M), which is
[[ Mnψ]] M.
For the converse, suppose that the condition in the theorem holds. Let A0 be the canon-




A0, and hence there exists a formula δ ∈   such that Mn = δop. Let DMn be the
formula Mnp ↔ δ.
We show ﬁrst that A is a  0 + DMn algebra. Since Th(A) is a logic (the theory of any
algebra is a logic), it sufﬁces to show that DMn ∈ Th(A). To see that this is the case, note
that if M is a model based on A, then Mn([[ p]] M) = δop([[ p]] M), which, by Lemma A.3.,
is [[δ]] M.
Since  0 is complete for A0, it follows by Lemma A.4. that  0+DMn is a conservative
extension of  0. It remains to show that   ⊆  0 + DMn. Suppose that ϕ ∈  . Then,
for any model M = (A,V),[ [ ϕ]] M = 1. By Lemma A.2., ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈  0 + DMn. Since
A is a ( 0 + DMn) algebra, [[ϕ]] M = [[ϕt]] M. But [[ϕt]] M = [[ϕt]] M0 for the model
M0 = (A0,V). Thus, ϕt is valid in every model based on A0. Since A0 is canonical,
it follows that ϕt ∈  0. Since ϕ ↔ ϕt ∈  0 + DMn, we have that that ϕ ∈  0+
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THEOREM 4.4. For each  -algebra A = (B,∨,¬,1,M1,...,Mn), O∗
A = O∗
A0 iff (a)
every  0-algebra A0 can be extended to a  -algebra A such that O∗
A = O∗
A0 and (b) if
A = (A0,Mn) and A  = (A0,M 
n) are  -algebras, then Mn = M 
n.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 3.4., using Theorems 4.1., 4.2., and 4.3. Nev-
ertheless, we prove here that (a) and (b) imply the ﬁrst condition because the proof is
simpler than the syntactic proof that reducibility and implicit deﬁnability imply explicit
deﬁnability.
Suppose that (a) Mn is reducible to M1,...,Mn−1 in   by the deﬁnition DMn, and
(b) Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  . By Theorem 4.2. we need to show that for each  -
algebra A, Mn ∈ O∗
A0. Let A be a  -algebra. By (a) and Theorem 4.3., applied to the
logic    =  [Mn/M 
n], the algebra A0 can be extended to an algebra A  with operators
M1,...,Mn−1M 
n, such that M 
n ∈ A∗
0. By (b) and Theorem 4.1., Mn = M 
n, which
completes the proof.  
THEOREM 5.1. If   is an orthodox logic in the language L(M1,...,Mn), then the
following are equivalent:
(a) the modality Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  ;
(b) for all  -frames (F0, Rn) and (F0, R 
n), we have Rn = R 
n;
(c) the predicate Rfo
n is implicitly deﬁned in  fo;
(d) the predicate Rfo
n is explicitly deﬁned in  fo.
Proof. As noted in Section 5, we need to show only that (a) is equivalent to (b). Suppose
that (a) holds and that F = (F0, Rn) and F  = (F0, Rn) are both  -frames. We can view
F +F  = (F0, Rn, R 
n) as a  +  -frame by taking R 
n to be the interpretation of M 
n. (It
is easy to check that Th(F + F ) is normal.) Since Mn is implicitly deﬁned in  , we must
have Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ ∈ Th(F + F ) for all formulas. This implies that Rn = R 
n, because
if Rn(w)  = R 
n(w) for some w, then, without loss of generality, Rn(w)  ⊆ R 
n(w) and
therefore Mnp ↔ M 
np is not valid in a model (A + A ,V) where V(p) = R 
n(w).N o w
suppose that (b) holds. Then Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ holds for all formulas ϕ in all ( +  )-frames.
As   is orthodox, so is ( +  ), and therefore it is complete with respect to its canonical
frame. Thus, Mnϕ ↔ M 
nϕ ∈   +   .  
PROPOSITION 5.2. The formula Rfo
K(x, y) ↔∃ z(Rfo
B (x,z) ∧ Rfo
B (y,z)) is valid in all
((KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}) frames.
Proof. It is well known (Hoek, 1993) that (KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2} is sound
and complete with respect to frames where (1) the RB relation is serial, transitive, and
Euclidean;6 (2) the RK is an equivalence relation; (3) RB ⊆ RK; and (4) for all x, y, and
z in W,i f(x, y) ∈ RK and (y,z) ∈ RB, then (x,z) ∈ RB (Hoek, 1993). The last two
conditions correspond to L1 and L2, respectively.
Let (W, RB, RK) be a ((KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}) frame. If (x, y) ∈ RK then,
since RB is serial, there exists some z such that (y,z) ∈ RB. By the semantic condition
corresponding to L2, we also have (x,z) ∈ RB. For the converse, suppose that there
exists some z such that (x,z) ∈ RB and (y,z) ∈ RB. Then, by the semantic condition
6 R is serial if for each x there exists a y such that (x, y) ∈ R; R is Euclidean if, for all x, y, and z,
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corresponding to L1, (x,z) ∈ RK and (y,z) ∈ RK. By the symmetry and transitivity of
RK, (x, y) ∈ RK.  
THEOREM 5.4. The algebra A = (W,B,∪,¬,W,B) is a KD45B algebra that cannot
be extended to a (KD45B + S5K +{ L1,L2}) algebra.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that A is a (KD45)B algebra.
In order to see that axiom KB is valid in A, we need to show that for each E and F in B,
¬B(¬E ∪F)∪(¬B(E)∪B(F)) = W, or equivalently, B(¬E ∪F) ⊆¬ B(E)∪B(F). The
left and right sides of this inclusion can differ only by 0. Suppose that 0 ∈¬ B(E ∪¬F).
Then it must be the case that ¬E ∪ F ∈ U. Now either E / ∈ U, in which case 0 ∈¬ B(E)
and we are done, or E ∈ U. In the latter case, since U is closed under intersection, it
follows that (¬E ∪ F) ∩ E = F ∩ E ∈ U, and thus F must be in U, and 0 ∈ B(F).I n
either case, it follows that 0 ∈¬ B(E) ∪ B(F), as desired.
For axiom DB, we need to show that for each set E, B(E) ⊆¬ B(¬E). Again, the two
sides of the inclusion can differ only by 0. If 0 ∈ B(E) then E ∈ U. But then ¬E / ∈ U.I t
easily follows that 0 ∈¬ B(¬E).
Axiom 4B requires that B(E) ⊆ B(B(E)).I f0∈ B(E) then E ∈ U, and B(E) =
E ∪{ 0}, which is also in U. Hence, B(B(E)) = B(E ∪{ 0}) = E ∪{ 0}.
For 5B, we have to prove that ¬B(E) ⊆ B(¬B(E)).I f0∈¬ B(E) then E / ∈ U, and
¬B(E) =¬ E ∪{ 0}. It follows that both ¬E and hence ¬E ∪{ 0} are in U, and therefore
B(¬E ∪{ 0}) =¬ E ∪{ 0}. This complete the proof that A is a (KD45)B algebra.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that A can be extended to a ((KD45)B + (S5)K +
{L1,L2}) algebra (A,K). Let E = W \{ 0}. We ﬁrst show that K(E) = E.B yT K,i t
is enough to show that E ⊆ K(E). Obviously, for each x ∈ E, B({x}) ={ x}.B yL 2
it follows that, for each x ∈ E, B({x}) ⊆ K(B({x})). Substituting {x} for B({x}),w e
conclude that {x}⊆K({x}) for each x ∈ E. It is easy to see that the validity of axiom
KK implies that K is monotonic, and hence K({x}) ⊆ K(E), from which we conclude as
required that {x}⊆K(E). Thus, E ⊆ K(E). Moreover, since K(E) = E, ¬K(E) ={ 0}.
By L1, K({0}) ⊆ B({0}). By the deﬁnition of B, B({0}) =∅ . Substituting ¬K(E) for {0}
in K({0}),w eh a v eK(¬K({E})) =∅ =¬ K({E}), contradicting 5K.  
We remark that Theorem 5.4. shows that the converse of Lemma A.4. does not hold.
THEOREM5.5. Let bealogicinL(B, J, K)suchthat(KD45)B+(S5)K+{L1,L2}⊆
 . If every (KD45)B algebra can be extended to an algebra of  ∩L(B, J), then K is not
reducible to B and J in  .
Proof. Suppose,bywayofcontradiction,thatevery(KD45)B algebracanbeextendedto
an algebra of  ∩L(B, J) and that K is reducible to B and J in  . Consider the (KD45)B
algebra A constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.4. By assumption, it can be extended to
a (  ∩ L(B, J)) algebra A . Since K is reducible to B and J, by Theorem 4.3., A  can be
extended to a  -algebra A  . In particular, A is a ((KD45)B + (S5)K +{ L1,L2}) algebra.
But this contradicts Theorem 5.4.  
COROLLARY 5.6. Let   be a logic in L(B, J, K) such that   ∩ L(B, J) = KD45B +
 J, where  J ⊆ S5J. Then K is not reducible to B and J in  .
Proof. Itiseasytoshowthatevery(KD45)B algebraA  canbeextendedtoa((KD45)B+
 J) algebra, simply by deﬁning an operator J on A  by taking J(1) = 1 and J(x) = 0
if x  = 1. This makes the resulting algebra an (S5)J algebra. The result now follows from
Theorem 5.5.  468 JOSEPH Y. HALPERN ET AL.
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